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FOSTER PARENTS VERSUS AGENCIES: A CASE 
STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF 
"THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD" 
DOCTRINE 
Sanford N. Katz* 
IT is generally conceded that, in the area of child welfare, social service agencies have the expert knowledge and methods for 
making enlightened custodial dispositions. Consequently, courts rely 
on agency decisions and have come to utilize agencies as the inter-
mediate placement for a child whose custody must be resolved. 
Child welfare agencies are given the authority to choose the custo-
dian for a child on a temporary, permanent, or indefinite basis, and 
may, at times, be authorized to supervise the placement of the child. 
In a certain sense, the court is surrendering its jurisdiction by its 
reliance on the welfare agencies, and this delegation of decision-
making power may have far-reaching consequences. Whether wel-
fare agencies use their power as wisely as courts assume depends 
largely on what we mean by "wisely" and on what agency is in-
volved. In general, courts unfortunately have neither the time nor 
the facilities to supervise agency placements, and it is only when an 
individual has been rejected as a qualified custodian that courts have 
an opportunity to review agency practices. 
A recurring problem which courts face is the need to resolve the 
conflict which arises when foster parents challenge the decision of 
agencies that have disqualified these persons from continuing their 
relationship with or adopting their foster child. This article will 
explore the role of courts in resolving these disputes and will sug-
gest some criteria by which the courts may be guided in deciding 
such questions. 
I. THE CASE OF LAURA 
A. Agency Participation 
The history of Laura, the five-and-a-half-year-old child whose 
custody was at issue in the New York case of In the matter of Jewish 
Child Care Association,1 is similar to that of many other children 
• Professor of Law, University of Florida. This article is adapted from a paper 
delivered at the American Orthopsychiatric Association Annual Meeting in San Fran-
cisco on April 13, 1966. The author is grateful to the Ford Foundation for supporting 
the research upon which this article is based.-Ed. 
1. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65, 156 N.E.2d 700 (1959). 
[145] 
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who are similarly involved in the struggle of foster parents to adopt 
children over the objections of placement agencies. When Laura 
was 13 months old, she was placed by the Jewish Child Care Asso-
ciation, a foster care agency, with Mr. and Mrs. Sanders, a childless 
couple in their thirties. Laura's mother, eighteen years old and 
unwed, had been unable to care for the baby at birth and had placed 
her with the New York City Department of Welfare, which trans-
ferred the child's custody to the Jewish Child Care Association 
(hereinafter referred to as the Agency). 
At placement, the Sanders were required to sign a document in 
which mutual promises were exchanged.2 Among other things, the 
couple promised to accept Laura as a member of their family and, 
as foster parents, to give her affection and care. They promised to 
follow the Agency's regulations regarding the boarding arrange-
ment, notification of and care during the child's illnesses, and 
changes in living conditions that would affect the child, such as 
2. The following is an example of the kind of agreement entered into by the 
Agency and the Sanders: 
In consideration of being accepted as foster parents by the Jewish Child Care 
Association [hereinafter referred to as the Agency], we agree as follows: 
I. The child placed with us will be accepted by us as a member of our family, 
and will receive our affection and care as foster parents. The Agency will furnish 
a monthly board payment, payable at the end of each month. At the time of 
placement, we will be notified of the specific rate for the child placed witp. us. 
The Agency will provide for the child's clothing, medical and dental expenses. 
We will be reimbursed for certain other expenditures made, as described in 
the Foster Parents' Manual, provided they have been previously authorized by 
the Agency. 
2. We will notify the Agency of any change or plans for change in our own 
life, which may affect the child placed with us. This will include, but is not 
limited to, vacation plans, illnesses, job changes, moving, and any change in the 
composition of our family. 
3. We will notify the Agency immediately if the child placed with us becomes 
ill, and we will comply with the Agency's arrangements for medical and dental 
care. 
4. We are aware that the Agency has the responsibility for making plans with 
regard to the child's relationship with his or her own relatives. We will cooperate 
with the arrangements made by the Agency worker for visits between the child 
and his or her own relatives. 
5. We acknowledge that we are accepting the child placed with us for an in-
determinate period, depending on the needs of the child and his family situation. 
We are aware that the legal responsibility for the foster child remains with the 
Agency, and we will accept and comply with any plans the Agency makes for 
the child. This includes the right to determine when and how the child leaves 
us, and we agree to cooperate with arrangements made toward that end. 
6. Should we find ourselves unable to continue giving foster care to the child 
placed with us, we will notify the Agency promptly, and will cooperate with the 
Agency in making the change of placement as easy as possible. For this reason, 
we will give the Agency as much time to make such change as is needed, unless 
our situation is emergent. 
Date ____________ _ 
Signature of Foster Mother ____________ _ 
Signature of Foster Father 
Countersigned: Agency Social Worker ____________ _ 
GOLDSTEIN 8: J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 1021-22 (1965). 
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modifications caused by vacations, job changes, and other events. 
They also agreed to cooperate with the Agency's plans for continu-
ing a relationship with the child's natural mother. Should the 
couple be unable to continue as foster parents, they promised to 
work with the Agency in making an orderly transition to another 
placement. The Sanders acknowledged that they were accepting 
Laura for an indeterminate period and were aware that the "legal 
responsibility for the child" remained with the Agency. 
During the first year after placement, the Sanders spoke with the 
Agency about adopting Laura. They were told that adoption was 
not possible and were asked to help the child understand who her 
natural mother was. The child had seen her natural mother once 
during the first year of placement. During the second year of foster 
care, the Sanders again mentioned their desire to adopt Laura. The 
Agency refused to consider the proposal and required the couple, as 
a condition for keeping the child, to sign a statement acknowledging 
that they had the child only on a foster home basis.8 Despite the 
signed statement, the Sanders persisted in their efforts to adopt 
Laura, unsuccessfully seeking approval from the child's natural 
mother, grandmother, and other relatives. When the Sanders re-
ll. The legal enforceability of a statement of this kind or of the child placement 
agreement is open to question. In Adoption of McDonald, 43 Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 
860 (1954), foster parents signed an agreement with an adoption agency which in-
cluded, among other provisions, a requirement that any request for the adoption of 
the child placed with them had to be approved by the agency, and a stipulation that 
if after one year the agency was satisfied with the training of the child and the char-
acter of the foster parents' home, it would allow the adoption. The agreement further 
provided that the agency had the right to remove the child previous to legal adoption 
if at any time the circumstances warranted it. About eight months after the place-
ment of the child, the foster father committed suicide. Later the agency demanded 
the return of the child. The foster mother refused to give up the child and petitioned 
a court for adoption without securing the agency's consent. The trial court granted 
the adoption, having concluded that the agency's consent was unnecessary. 
One of the arguments which the agency made in its appeal to the California Su-
preme Court was that the foster mother was estopped from pursuing the adoption by 
virtue of the agreement she and her husband signed at the time of placement. Ad-
dressing himself to this argument, Justice Traynor wrote: 
The [State] department [of Social Welfare] ••• has no power by regulation or 
otherwise to add to or detract from the rules for adoption prescribed in the Civil 
Code •••• Thus, neither appellant, the department, the county agency, nor any 
private agency had the right by regulation or by agreement to deprive petitioner 
of the rights granted her by section 226 of the Civil Code to petition the court 
and have the court determine whether the petition should or should not be 
granted. If the department could give a licensed agency the right to control the 
adoption of a relinquished child, it could give such an agency the right to con-
trol the adoption of any child not subject to parental control. The statutory pro-
visions governing adoptions cannot be so circumvented.. 
In a proceeding such as this the child is the real party in interest and is not a 
party to any agreement. It is the welfare of the child that controls, and any 
agreement others may have made for its custody is made subject to the court's 
independent judgment as to what is for the best interests of the child. 
Id. at 461, 274 P.2d at 868; See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 224(n) (Supp. 1964). 
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quested permission to take Laura with them on an out-of-state vaca-
tion, the Agency refused, asserting that the child should be -returned 
to her natural mother during that time. Laura, then four, had lived 
with the Sanders for three years and had seen her natural mother 
only twice. She was not to see her mother again until the litigation 
over her custody began. 
The Sanders' constant efforts to adopt Laura in contradiction of 
their statements, along with the Agency's belief that the couple had 
become too emotionally attached to the child, prompted the Agency 
to demand Laura's return. The couple refused and the Agency 
brought a writ of habeas corpus to demand the child's release from 
the Sanders' home. As seen from the perspective of the foster 
parents, the Agency's action was potentially beneficial for various 
reasons. It allowed the Sanders to bypass administrative remedies 
and to obtain an immediate judicial review of the Agency's decision 
denying their adoptive suitability. Considering their strained rela-
tions with the Agency, the Sanders' chances for administrative 
relief would probably have been slim. Furthermore, since a habeas 
corpus proceeding is a method by which a court may explore the 
child's welfare4 beyond the narrow issue of the legal right to cus-
tody,5 the fact that the Agency was the legal guardian of Laura did 
not place it in a significantly advantageous position vis-a-vis the 
Sanders. 
B. The Trial 
In the trial court proceedings to determine whether Laura's 
"best interests" would be served by a custodial change, much of the 
testimony was focused on the effect that the proposed change would 
have on the child's natural mother as well as on the child's own 
physical and emotional well-being. The line of questioning in which 
the trial judge and the attorneys engaged seemed to be based on the 
underlying assumption that the goal of the proceedings was to 
determine how Laura's needs could best be secured in light of the 
inability of the natural mother to raise the child. 
The trial judge heard testimony from the foster parents, repre-
sentatives of the Agency, the Department of Welfare, and a psy-
4. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Berry v. Berry, 
219 Ala. 403, 122 So. 615 (1929); Porter v. Chester, 208 Ga. 309, 66 S.E.2d 729 (1951); 
Heuvel v. Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 121 N.W.2d 216 (1963). Even the matter of child 
support may be explored. See Howarth v. Northcott, 152 Conn. 460, 208 A.2d 540 
(1965). Contra, Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S.E. 426 (1938); Pugh v. Pugh, 
133 W. Va. 501, 56 S.E.2d 901 (1949). But some jurisdictions limit the court's inquiry 
on habeas corpus to the narrow issue of the legal right to custody. See, e.g., May v. 
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (Ohio). 
5. See New York Foundling Hosp. v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429 (1906); Pukas v. Pukas, 
129 W. Va. 765, 42 S.E.2d 11 (1947). 
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chiatrist. The Agency acknowledged that the Sanders had taken 
good care of the child and were providing her with a comfortable 
home environment. However, it claimed that, because of the great 
love of the foster parents for the child, Laura should be removed 
from their custody and placed in a "neutral environment" where 
foster parents would be called "aunt" and "uncle" instead of 
"mother" and "father" and where "there would not be this terrible 
pull on the child between her loyalty to her foster parents and her 
mother."6 In other words, the Agency did not claim that the foster 
parents were depriving the child of love, but rather argued that they 
were indulging her with too much love. The effect of their indul-
gence on the child, the Agency urged, was a strain on her relation-
ship with her natural mother. 
A large part of the trial consisted of the interrogation of a psy-
chiatrist called by the foster parents. In his testimony, he analyzed 
the effect of a custodial change on Laura's emotional development. 
In his opinion, the Sanders' love for the child had positive rather 
than damaging emotional effects; indeed, Laura's removal from her 
foster parents would be detrimental to her emotional growth. He 
stated that latency was a critical period in a child's development and 
that, at Laura's age, she needed the security of a sustained relation-
ship with her foster parents. 
The trial judge apparently either was not sufficiently convinced 
by the psychiatric testimony or was persuaded by the Agency's argu-
ment that the child was becoming too attached to her foster parents, 
thus threatening her "relationship" with her natural mother. He 
decided to remove Laura from her foster parents and to allow the 
Agency to regain custody and place her in a "neutral environ-
ment."7 After the intermediate appellate court affirmed the decision 
of the trial court,8 the Sanders appealed to the New York Court of 
Appeals, which held in favor of the Agency in a split (4-3) opinion.9 
6. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 227, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68, 156 N.E.2d 700, 702 (1959). 
7. Jewish Child Care Ass'n v. Sanders, 9 Misc. 2d 402, 172 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sup. 
Ct. 1957), aff'd, 174 N.Y.S.2d 335 (App. Div. 1958), afj'd, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65, 156 N.E.2d 
700, 704 (Ct. App. 1959). 
8. Ibid. The basis of the New York Supreme Court's opinion was as follows: 
Respondents have, the court feels, become fond of the child to an extent which 
has resulted in an attempt by them to induce the mother to permit an adoption 
by them; she has resisted these efforts and the conflict has resulted in this pro-
ceeding. The petitioner believes (quite correctly in the court's opinion) that it 
cannot suffer its established practice to be set at naught solely because respon-
dents believe they can contribute more to the child's welfare than petitioner and 
the mother can. 
The court does not believe that the best interest of this child will be served 
by the condonation of a disregard of their own obligations and agreements by 
the respondents, however well-intentioned they may be. 
Id. at 403, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 631. 
9. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 1~3 N.Y.S.2d 65, 156 N.E.2d 700 (1959). 
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C. The Appeal 
In the New York Court of Appeals' report, there is a discernible 
and major shift in emphasis from that found in the lower court's 
opinion. The trial court viewed "the best interests of the child" 
doctrine in terms of securing Laura's health needs in light of her 
natural mother's condition. The New York Court of Appeals first 
concentrated on the legal status of the claimants and then inter-
preted "the best interests of the child" in terms of the continuity of 
family loyalty and the law. 
To the majority of the Court of Appeals, the fact that the 
Sanders were Laura's foster, rather than natural or future adoptive, 
parents was crucial. The court perceived foster parenthood as some-
thing less than full parenthood. By showing "extreme love," "affec-
tion" and "possessiveness" and by acting more like natural than like 
foster parents, the Sanders, in the court's estimation, had gone 
beyond the limits of their role as set out in the placement agree-
ment. In essence, what the majority took as conclusive in the case, 
namely the "vital fact ... that Mr. and Mrs. Sanders are not, and 
presumably will never be, Laura's parents by adoption,''10 was the 
very issue the court was to decide. 
The court stressed its concern for preserving the natural ties 
between Laura and her mother. "In considering what is in Laura's 
best interests,'' the court wrote, "it was not only proper, but neces-
sary ... to consider the facts in terms of their significance to Laura's 
eventual return to her own mother."11 And later the court stated: 
What is essentially at stake here is the parental custodial right. Al-
though Child Care has the present legal right to custody . . . it 
stands, as against the Sanders, in a representative capacity as the 
protector of Laura's mother's inchoate custodial right and the 
parent-child relationship which is to become complete in the 
future.12 
Finally, in its concluding remarks, the court crystallized its main 
preferences as follows: 
[T]he more important considerations of the child's best interests, 
the recognition and preservation of her mother's primary love and 
custodial interest, and the future life of the mother and child to-
gether are paramount.13 
10. Id. at 229, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 70, 156 N.E.2d at 703. 
11. Id. at 228, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 69, 156 N.E.2d at 703. 
12. Id. at 229, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 70, 156 N.E.2d at 703. 
13. Id. at 230, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 71, 156 N.E.2d at 704. 
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1. Family Loyalty 
The parental right to custody, the doctrine referred to by the 
court as both "paramount" and "fundamental," holds that any bio-
logical parent is entitled to the custody of his child unless the parent 
is affirmatively shown to be unfit.14 Many courts have claimed that 
the right is based on principles of morality and natural affection.15 
However, the common law history of the doctrine reveals that it 
may have been created for considerations of wealth rather than the 
dictates of a moral code. During the feudal period, custodial rights, 
which had commercial value, were subject to transfer and sale; a 
child was a financial asset to his father. During this early period, 
therefore, a custodial right was a property right.16 In time, as concern 
developed for the child's welfare and as the mother was legally con-
sidered a joint custodian together with the father, the emphasis 
shifted from the property theory of custody toward the personal 
status theory.17 That is, the natural parents, because of their rela-
tionship to the child, were presumed to be the custodians best fitted 
to serve the child's needs. 
At first glance, the parental right to custody may seem to be a 
doctrine competing with "the best interests of the child" approach. 
Indeed, the parental right theory has been described as a secondary 
doctrine in child custody matters.18 Perhaps, however, it is more 
appropriate to say that the parental right doctrine is often treated as 
if it were an expression of "the best interests of the child." Most 
frequently courts, invoking the parental right doctrine when they 
prefer to award custody to the child's natural parents rather than 
other claimants, assume that the disposition best serves the child's 
14. See, e.g., Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944); McGuire v. Mc-
Guire, 190 Kan. 524, 376 P.2d 908 (1962); Stout v. Stout, 166 Kan. 459, 201 P.2d 637 
(1949); Ex parte .Barnes, 54 Ore. 548, 104 Pac. 296 (1909). See also IowA CODE § 633.559 
(1963). 
15. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 105 Cal. App. 2d 392, 233 P.2d 639 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1951); Acomb v. Billeiter, 175 So. 2d 25 (La. Ct. App. 1965); In the matter of 
Lewis, 35 Misc. 2d 117, 230 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Surr. Ct. 1962); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 
15 Misc. 2d 389, 181 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1959); People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 
305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953). 
16. See Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. Cm. L. REv. 672, 676-77 (1942); 
ten.Broek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and 
Present Status, Part II, 16 STAN. L. REv. 900, 925 (1964). 
17. For many purposes, however, the child is still treated as property; there has 
been a shift, but not a substitution. 
18. Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a Child May Be Adopted 
Without the Consent of His Parent, 39 U. DET. L.J. 347, 354-60 (1962); Alternatives 
to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 
151, 152-53 (1963). 
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welfare.19 When custody is awarded to others, it is likely that courts 
will simply state that "the best interests of the child" demand such a 
disposition,20 or that "the superior rights" of parents, or the pre-
sumption in their favor, must yield to "the best interests of the 
child."21 It seems safe to say that when courts invoke the parental 
right doctrine to award custody to the natural parents, they are 
merely articulating an archaic notion, based upon a preference for 
the continuity of blood ties or the preservation of kinship loyalty, in 
order to justify a decision. It is a significant aspect of Child Care 
that the majority was more concerned with the symbol of natural 
family loyalty than its fact. As indicated previously, Laura's natural 
mother had seen the child twice in four years, and Laura's loyalty to 
her would seem, at best, to be more imaginary than i-eal. 
2. Integrity of the Law 
In his final remark in his opinion for the Court of Appeals, 
Chief Judge Conway came to grips with what appeared to be his 
primary concern. While the interests of Laura and her natural 
mother (but apparently not those of the foster parents) were of 
significant importance, another factor was involved. The integrity 
of the law, as manifested in the child placement contract and in the 
administrative decisions of a private agency, had been challenged. 
In order to maintain authority, these administrative policies had to 
be affirmed and the child placement agreement enforced: "[T]he 
program of agencies such as Child Care . . . may not be subverted 
by foster parents who breach their trust."22 
The majority in Child Care was again concerned with symbols. 
Judge Conway seemed compelled to preserve the sanctity of legal 
doctrines and, indirectly, the reputation of a community institution. 
The Sanders had been a threat both to the integrity and the stability 
of the placement contract23 and to the prestige of the Agency. To 
give Laura to her foster parents would have been to reward persons 
who had failed to fulfill their promises and who had undermined 
the Agency's decision. It seems that by protecting community in-
stitutions, the court shifted its focus from Laura's welfare to other 
19. See, e.g., Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944); Stout v. Stout, 
166 Kan. 459, 201 P.2d 637 (1949); Bond v. Bond, 167 So. 2d 388 (La. Ct. App. 1964); 
Ex parte Barnes, 54 Ore. 548, 104 Pac. 296 (1909). 
20. See, e.g., Kennedy v. State Dept. of Pensions &: Security, 277 Ala. 5, 166 So. 2d 
736 (1964); Forbes v. Haney, 204: Va. 712, 133 S.E.2d 533 (1963). 
21. See, e.g., Bond v. Bond, 167 So. 2d 388 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Mouton v. St. 
Romain, 245 La. 839, 161 So. 2d 737 (1964). 
22. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 230, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71, 156 N.E.2d 700, 704 (1959). 
23. But see note 3 supra. 
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matters: the continuity of legal doctrine and the prestige of a social 
service agency. 
Child custody proceedings, more than other litigation, may be 
merely a cover for the real conflicts: a power struggle between indi-
viduals, institutions, or individuals and institutions, which culmi-
nates in a decision that indicates a preference for certain social 
values over others. It is sometimes said that, in child custody dis-
putes between divorced parents, the child may act as a tool of the 
parents and the court as an arena in which the parents can display 
their mutual hostilities. In Child Gare, one was not witnessing an 
intra-family conflict, but rather a struggle between community insti-
tutions: welfare agency and foster family. The important question 
before the court was not necessarily who should be awarded custody 
of Laura, although this inevitably was resolved, but whose decision-
making power was to be recognized, the welfare agency's or the 
foster parents'. In Child Gare, the Agency prevailed, and the deci-
sion therefore may be described as one which furthered the best 
interests of the Agency. Whether it was in the best interests of the 
child is hard to say. The psychiatrist and a dissenting judge thought 
it was not.24 
II. TOWARD CLARIFYING "THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD" 
Assuming that the preservation of biological ties, the mainte-
nance of the sanctity of contract law, and the protection of the 
prestige of a social service agency were the basis for the court's deci-
sion in Child Gare, the question remains: were these considerations 
relevant to determining the custodial disposition that would further 
Laura's best interests? This question is difficult to answer unless one 
first defines for oneself "the best interests of the child," for the doc-
trine has no absolute definition. Nor is there uniformity in the 
results of the cases in which the doctrine has been applied. In 
general, all that can be said is that, as the doctrines of "bona fide 
purchaser" in the law of real property and "good faith" in nego-
tiable instruments, so "the best interests of the child doctrine" is a 
mandate from the legislature, directing the judge to use his discre-
24. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Froessel anticipated the ultimate result of the 
case, multiple placements for Laura. He wrote: 
If Laura is to be bandied about meanwhile from family to family until she is 
transferred to her mother, each such change will be extremely difficult for the 
child, as testified to without contradiction by the psychiatrist at the hearing. Why 
multiply the shocks? And if the mother never chooses to take Laura, and that 
does not appear to be unlikely from the record before us, the child could not 
find a better home than she now enjoys. 
5 N.Y.2d at 235, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 75, 156 N.E.2d at 707. 
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tion in making a disposition.25 Obviously, such an interpretation of 
the doctrine permits what has, in fact, taken place in Child Care: 
the use of value preferences dominant in the community and re-
flected in important community institutions. 
Perhaps a reason for the constantly shifting bases of child cus-
tody opinions relating to establishing and reorganizing the parent-
child relationship26 is that courts feel there are few legal tests to 
which these decisions can be subjected. This conclusion may be un-
sound. Legal prescriptions existing in other areas, such as the stan-
dards relating to supervising the parent-child relationship, might be 
useful as guides. In this section, an effort will be made to formulate 
criteria for deciding custodial disputes and to provide a framework 
that might be helpful in narrowing and disciplining a court's scope 
of inquiry during both the information gathering and the evaluat-
ing stages of the decision. Furthermore, the proposed analytical 
scheme might provide judges a means by which they can express 
their preferences. 
A. Purpose of the Parent-Chi~d Relationship 
Our cultural preferences may cause one to assume that a child is 
best reared in a family setting. The task in child placement is to find 
a family that will fulfill a child's needs. One way of determining 
these needs is to try to identify what the community expects the 
family, particularly parents, whether natural, adoptive, or foster, to 
provide for a child. Or, we may try to identify the goals of the 
parent-child relationship, regardless of what kind of parent is in-
volved.27 Answers are provided in reported cases, statutes, and pre-
25. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 46-24 (1958) (the court can "make any order 
which it deems reasonable"); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1956) (the court shall make 
~ custodial disposition "as shall appear reasonable and proper"); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 
(1947) (the court shall make a custodial disposition "as it deems just and proper"); 
NEB. REv. STAT. § 42.311 (1960 Rev.) (the court shall make a custodial disposition "as 
it shall deem just and proper'). See also Foster &: Freed, Child Custody, Part I, 39 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 423, 438 (1964). 
26. The terms establishment and reorganization of the parent-child relationship 
refer to the substantive and procedural requisites for becoming a natural, adoptive, 
foster, neglected, and emancipated parent or child. The term "supervision" refers to 
governmental administration of established and reorganized parent-child relation• 
ships. This terminology is developed in GOLDSTEIN &: J. KATZ, op. cit. supra note 2, at 
1-5 (1965). 
27. In much of the legal literature, a distinction, perhaps artificial and distracting, 
is made between foster care (giving rise to the foster parent-child relationship) and 
adoption. Foster care is regarded as temporary and adoption is considered permanent. 
See, e.g., Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rep. 707 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1961); Estate of McCardle, 95 Colo. 250, 35 P .2d 850 (1934); Schneider v. 
Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. 180, 52 A.2d 564 (Ch. 1947); Griego v. Hogan, 71 N.M. 280, 
377 P.2d 953 (1963); Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wash. 510, 364 P.2d 444 (1961). This dis• 
tinction can be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, it may relate to the 
duration of the status. Or, it might be suggestive of the legal implications that flow 
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vailing middle class mores about parental responsibilities, but the 
discussion below will be restricted primarily to cases involving the 
state's supervision of the parent-child relationship. The pattern that 
emerges from these cases suggests a concern for promoting (I) order, 
integrity and family loyalty; (2) financial security; (3) health and 
education; and (4) morality and respect. 
I. Order, Integrity and Family Loyalty 
At birth a child is considered to be in the custody of his natural 
parents. Some have looked upon the family relationship that is 
established at this time as a trust which parents hold for the benefit 
of their child and the state.28 In reality, however, due to the sheer 
necessities of the circumstances, parents assume control over and 
have immediate supervision of their infant to the exclusion of 
others. Except for certain compulsory governmental health measures 
during the first few weeks of their child's life, such as the silver 
nitrate treatment at birth and perhaps the PKU (phenylketonuria) 
test later, natural parents have the power to make decisions affecting 
their child's life.29 
from either status: foster care gives rise to ambiguous relationships while adoption 
creates fixed legal relationships similar to and sometimes identical with those between 
parents and their natural children. The following discussion may raise doubts about 
these assumptions. Also, it may lead one to question whether Mr. and Mrs. Sanders' 
status as foster parents should have been "the vital fact" for decision. 
Foster parent refers to the status that arises when one not related, by either direct 
parental blood or through formal legal proceedings officially establishing an adoptive 
parent-child relationship, assumes the role generally regarded in the community as 
the one held by a parent. In traditional legal terminology, he would be one who 
stands in loco parentis. This doctrine, an illustration of a legal fiction, holds that 
people who act as if they were natural parents are legally held to the same standards 
as parents. To determine the status, courts tend to apply agency law notions, namely 
whether the parent "held himself out to the world" as a parent. For a full discussion 
and history of the doctrine, see Schneider v. Schneider, supra. 
Foster status may arise in numerous ways, for instance, through direct or indirect 
formal judicial authority, by a formal or informal arrangement, or by voluntarily 
caring for a foundling. It also includes parents of a child placed in their custody 
prior to a final adoption decree and parents who hold themselves out as adoptive 
parents believing in the validity of an adoptive decree which is legally defective. 
Further illustrations include the situation that arises when a court awards guardian• 
ship and custody to persons other than the natural parents, or when a court awards 
a social welfare agency guardianship and custody of a child with the power to dele• 
gate (usually through an agreement that has the appearance of a legal contract) the 
parental role to persons chosen by the agency. This is what occurred in Laura's case. 
A not infrequent situation that may give rise to the foster• parent-child relationship 
is that in which one accepts into his home and treats as his own a child surrendered 
by his parents. This may occur by a formal or informal agreement or through aban-
donment. On the other hand, one is an adoptive parent only at the culmination of 
valid legal adoption proceedings. 
28. See, e.g., Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J. Eq. 64, 26 A.2d 799 (Ch. 1942); Lippincott 
v. Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq. 517, 128 Atl. 254 (Ct. Err. 8: App. 1925); Elliot v. Elliot, 235 
N.C. 153, 69 S.E.2d 224 (1952). 
29. Many states have statutory provisions regulating the silver nitrate test. See, 
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In legal terminology, a parent's control over and supervision of 
his child is called the "parental right to custody," and, if it can be 
included in the bundle of rights associated with marriage, establish-
ing a home and rearing children, it can be claimed as a right that is 
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental,"30 and, therefore, constitutionally protected. 
The United States Supreme Court has employed substantive due 
process to protect the family, especially the husband-wife and par-
ent-child relationships, from unwarranted governmental intrusion. 
This principle of protecting the freedom of the family is supported 
by cases beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska,31 in which the Court 
held invalid a state statute prohibiting the teaching of the German 
language to children who had not passed the eighth grade, and 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,32 in which the Court ruled unconstitu-
tional a law preventing the operation of private schools. 'NI.eyer and 
Pierce were considered to involve fundamental rights protected by 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
The principle that there is a realm of family life which the state 
cannot invade, save for some compelling reason such as protecting 
children from imminent danger, was reinforced by Prince v. Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts.33 In that case, the United States Su-
preme Court held that Massachusetts child labor laws were not un-
reasonable restrictions on either a parent's right to rear children, 
especially with regard to teaching and practicing a particular faith, 
or a child's right to observe that faith. For the purpose of illustra-
ting the extent to which the Court believes the parent-child relation-
ship should be secure and free from unreasonable interference from 
the state, Mr. Justice Rutledge's words are relevant: 
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child 
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply 
nor hinder .... And it is in recognition of this that these decisions 
[Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska] have respected 
the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. 
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public 
interest, as against a claim of religious liberty .... Acting to 
guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as 
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 19.92 (1958); FLA. STAT. § 383.05 (1965); ILL. REv. STAT. 
ch. 91, § 108· (1963). Minnesota specifically waives the test if parents object to it. 
MINN. STAT. § 144.12(8) (1965 Supp.). New York has enacted a statutory provision re-
quiring the administering of the PKU test. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-a. 
30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
31. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
32. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
33. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
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parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school 
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in 
many other ways. . . . The catalogue need not be lengthened. 
It is sufficient to show . . . that the state has a wide range of 
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affect-
ing the child's welfare; and that this includes, to some extent, 
matters of conscience and religious conviction.34 
Although it was the privacy of the husband-wife relationship that 
had been invaded by the State of Connecticut's restriction on the 
use of birth control devices in Griswold v. Connecticut,35 that case 
has ramifications for the parent-child relationship. In Griswold, Mr. 
Justice Douglas extracted from the Bill of Rights a penumbra! 
right of marital and familial privacy. Mr. Justice Goldberg's inter-
pretation of the ninth amendment gave additional support to pre-
cedent affirming the goal of integrity and security in the family. 
The significance of his remarks about the husband-wife relationship 
for that of the parent-child should be apparent. 
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that 
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights 
to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar 
order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected. 
Although the Constitution does not speak in so many words 
of the right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it offers 
these fundamental rights no protection. The fact that no par-
ticular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State 
from disrupting the traditional relation of the family-a relation 
as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization-surely does 
not show that the Government was meant to have the power to do 
so. Rather, as the Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes, there 
are fundamental personal rights such as this one, which are pro-
tected from abridgment by the Government though not specifically 
mentioned in the Constitution.36 
That the parent-child relationship should be secure, stable, 
orderly and free from unreasonable interference by the state or 
others is further emphasized in cases which establish the right of a 
parent to procedural due process and other procedural advantages 
when the custody of his child is being litigated. The due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires a court to notify a 
natural parent and to give him an opportunity to participate in a 
proceeding designed to determine his child's custody. Some courts 
have analogized parents' rights in their children to "property rights" 
34. Id. at 166-67. 
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
36. Id. at 495-96 (concurring opinion). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-
52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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within the protection of the due process clause;37 others have main-
tained that these rights are protected by the guarantee of liberty.38 
In addition to procedural due process, there is a procedural pref-
erence given to natural parents in that the burden of proving a 
natural parent's unfitness is placed on the individual who desires to 
gain custody of a child over the natural parent's objection.39 The 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Armstrong v. 
Manzo40 illustrates the extent to which the Court will go to protect 
a natural parent's right to his child. In that case, the issue was 
whether an adoption decree was valid when secured by the child's 
natural mother and her second husband without notification to the 
first husband, the child's natural father. Although the natural father 
had subsequently obtained a hearing on his motion to vacate the 
decree because of the lack of notice and had presented evidence at 
that hearing in an attempt to establish the necessity of his consent to 
the adoption, the Court held that the decree was invalid. The 
failure of the adoption court to provide the natural father an oppor-
tunity to contest the adoption was more than a routine denial of 
procedural due process, because the court's action permanently de-
prived "a legitimate parent of all that parenthood implies."41 The 
natural father's absence in the adoption proceedings gave the adop-
tive applicant (second husband) an undue advantage since he did 
not have to carry the burden of proving his own qualifications and 
the natural father's unfitness. In the subsequent hearing on the 
motion to vacate the decree, this crucial allocation of the burden of 
proof was reversed, for the natural father, since he was the moving 
party in that hearing, was required to demonstrate affirmatively his 
fitness to have custody of the child. The Court, realizing the deci-
siveness of the location of the burden of proof, was unwilling to 
deprive the natural father of his procedural preference in the adop-
tion proceeding. 
Another, perhaps indirect, indication of a community policy 
favoring the integrity of the parent-child relationship is that the 
law discourages and may even prohibit the unconditional voluntary 
termination of the parent-child relationship, regardless of the type 
37. See, e.g., Brooks v. De Witt, 178 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). 
38. See, e.g., Stubbs v. Hammon, 135 N.W.2d 540 (Iowa 1965). 
39. Professor tenBroek convincingly demonstrates that the burden of proof in 
favor of parental fitness applies mainly to members of the middle classes, but is sub-
stantially relaxed as to the poor. In cases involving the poor, "parental fitness" is 
examined rather than presumed. tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: 
Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, Part III, 17 STAN. L. REv. 614, 676 
(1965). 
40. 380 U.S. 545 (1965). 
41. Id. at 550. 
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of parental status. Criminal sanctions attach to parents who fail to 
fulfill the incidents of the right to custody: companionship, financial 
support and health care.42 It is doubtful whether any state permits 
the voluntary legal termination of the parent-child relationship 
unless there is a satisfactory placement available for the child or 
unless there is reason to believe that denying the termination peti-
tion will be detrimental to the child's welfare.43 Thus, natural 
parents probably would not be allowed to terminate the full range 
of their duties, whether the child be healthy or handicapped, in the 
absence of a showing that the action would serve the child's 
welfare.44 
In the adoptive parent-child relationship, the goal of order and 
integrity is also maintained. Once the adoptive status is legally 
established, the adoptive parent's duty and right to control and 
supervise his adopted child, even to the exclusion of the child's 
natural family, is preserved in the same way as the custodial right of 
the natural parent.45 Courts are reluctant to set aside an adoption 
decree, or to terminate or annul an adoption. Some courts have 
taken the position that, absent express statutory authority clearly 
establishing grounds sufficient for terminating the adoption, adop-
tive parents cannot be relieved of their parental obligations.46 Juris-
dictions having statutory provisions allowing termination or annul-
ment in certain circumstances, such as a child's misconduct, his 
physical or mental illness unknown at the time of adoption, or 
when the best interests of the child demand termination, tend to 
apply these provisions narrowly.47 Thus, adoptive parents may not 
divest themselves of their custodial duties merely because they are 
dissatisfied with their child, regret their decision about adoption, or 
42. These are usually found in child neglect statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 
11.35.010 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-801 (1956); Cor.o. REv. STAT. § 22-2-1 
(1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-815 (1956); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 88(b) (1957); 
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 273, § I (1957 Supp. 1965); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.99(B) 
(1963); Wis. STAT. § 947.15 (1961). 
43. The Model Adoption Act drafted by the U.S. Department of Health, Educa-
tion, &: ·welfare provides for the voluntary termination of parental rights regardless 
of the availability of satisfactory placement. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH, EDUCATION &: WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE GUIDES FOR THE TERMINATION OF PA-
RENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 12-13 (1961). 
44. This parallels the law of assignment: one may assign one's rights, but not 
one's duties (delegation of duties leaves one responsible unless there is a novation). 
45. See Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947). 
46. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 214 Ore. 664, 330 P.2d 151 (1958). 
47. See, e.g., Buttrey v. West, 212 Ala. 321, 102 So. 456 (1924); Pelt v. Tunks, 153 
Colo. 215, 385 P.2d 261 (1963); Mulligaw v. Wingard, 72 Ga. App. 539, 34 S.E.2d 305 
(Ct. App. 1945) trans. from 198 Ga. 816, 33 S.E.2d 269; Succession of Williams, 224 
La. 871, 71 So. 2d 229 (1954); In re Pierro, 173 Misc. 123, 17 N.Y.S,2d 233 (Surr. Ct: 
1940). 
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think they made a bad deal.48 This is true even if the adoptive 
child's natural parents wish to resume a legal relationship with 
him. 49 Adoption is said to create "a for better, for worse situation,''50 
and is therefore seemingly more protected than the marriage of the 
adoptive parents, which may be dissolved by divorce. 
It is said that the parental right to custody does not attach to 
foster parents unless specifically decreed by a court; in other words, 
foster parents seem to have more duties than rights. This statement, 
however, may be misleading, for foster parents may in fact enjoy the 
right to custody without benefit of the label. A de facto custodial 
interest develops in a foster parent when the foster relationship con-
tinues over a length of time. Courts are reluctant to interfere with 
this interest and, if they do interfere, the foster parent is generally 
entitled to notification and an opportunity to appear and defend his 
interest.51 A continuing foster relationship, if secure and orderly, is 
typically protected even against a natural parent's unreasonable in-
trusion.52 If a natural parent wishes to interfere with the foster 
parent relationship, he must, as any other individual, carry the 
burden of proving the foster parent's unfitness, as well as the burden 
of showing that the child's needs will be served best by another 
custodial arrangement. 53 
Under certain conditions, a foster parent may terminate his re-
lationship with his foster child. The most important of these condi-
tions is that the foster parent must intentionally perform a positive 
act-which ordinarily implies obtaining the consent of all parties in 
interest-severing all aspects of the relationship.54 Announcing a 
decision to terminate the relationship while continuing to live with 
the child is insufficient.55 A foster parent may not choose to honor 
his right to enjoy companionship and fail in his duty to support.116 
48. See, e.g., Parsons v. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147 (1898); In re Adoption 
of L (Essex County Ct., P. Div.) 56 N.J. Super. 46, 151 A.2d 435 (1959). 
49. See In re Adoption of L., supra note 48. 
50. In re Adoption of a Minor, 214 N.E.2d 281 (Mass. 1966). 
51. See In re Adoption of Cheney, 244 Iowa 1180, 59 N.W.2d 685 (1953). 
52. See Cummins v. Bird, 230 Ky. 296, 19 S.W.2d 959 (1929). 
53. See State v. Knight, 135 So. 2d 126 (La. App. 1961). 
54. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. W. Va. 1952); Leyerly v. 
United States, 162 F.2d 79 (10th Cir. 1947); Young v. Hipple, 273 Pa. 439, 117 Atl. 185 
(1922). 
55. See Capek v. Kl'Opik, 129 Ill. 509, 21 N.E. 836 (1889); Schneider v. Schneider, 
25 N.J. Misc. 180, 52 A.2d 564 (Ch. 1947). 
56. That there is a duty to support under these circumstances is evident from 
public welfare law. The "man-in-the-house" rule, or, as it is sometimes called, the 
"substitute parent" policy, was stated in People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 2d 521, 524, 360 
P.2d 33, 34 (1961): 
[U]nder regulations of the State Board of Social Welfare a stepfather living in 
the home is responsible for the support of the mother of a needy child unless 
incapacitated and unable to support • • • • A man living in the home assuming 
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Presumably, therefore, the policy discussed above of protecting and 
sanctioning an established and subsisting relationship is not appli-
cable when a foster parent decides to terminate that relationship. 
The context in which questions are raised about the foster parent's 
power to terminate the foster parent-child relationship is usually a 
stepfather's refusal to continue to support his non-adopted stepchild 
after he has divorced the child's natural mother. Courts normally 
reason that the order which was present in the relationship has been 
disrupted by the divorce and that no purpose would be served by 
requiring the continuance of the duty to support, correlative to the 
right to custody, in the absence of a sustained relationship. New 
York, however, goes further than most jurisdictions in requiring a 
step-parent, after divorce or death of the spouse, to support the 
spouse's child if his failure to provide such support would place an 
economic burden on the state. 57 
2. Financial Security 
The statutory obligation which both natural and adoptive 
parents have to support their children probably rests more on the 
policy of preventing children from becoming economic burdens on 
the state than on any other notion.58 The level of financial security 
the role of spouse has the same responsibility as that of a stepfather for the 
mother and the needy children. • • • 
An illustration of state welfare regulations pertaining to the "substitute parent" 
policy is found in Part III, Section V of the Georgia Manual of Public Welfare 
,.1dministration, dealing with the eligibility conditions for the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children Program (AFDC). Subdivision (5) of Section V(3) disqualifies 
needy dependent children from the program if they are found to have a "substitute 
father," The subdivision states: 
(5) Substitute Father: A man living in common•law relationship with a woman is 
considered a substitute father of any child had by that woman, or any child that 
woman has had by another man. Further, a man living in common-law rela• 
tionship with a woman is responsible for the support and care of his and her 
children, regardless of whether or not he is married to another woman. Regu-
lations place the same responsibility on this man as if he were the legal husband. 
The rules for establishing deprivation are the same as those used in establishing 
it in a legal•father situation. 
GEORGIA STATE DEP'T OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, DIV, OF SOCIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION, MANUAL OF PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATION 7 (1964). See also Pacht, Support 
of Dependents in the District of Columbia: Part I, 9 How. L.J. 20, 36-38 (1963); ten-
Broek, supra note 39. 
57. Department of Welfare v. Siebel, 6 N.Y.2d 536, 190 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1959), ap-
peal dismissed, 361 U.S. 535 (1960), construing N.Y. CITY DoM. REL. CT. ACT § 101(5). 
In 1962 the New York Domestic Relations Act was repealed. Section 101(5) was 
reenacted in N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 415 (1963). See also tenBroek, supra note 39. 
This is just one illustration of the "Dual System of Family Law." The New York rule 
establishes a different law for step-parents of poor children than applies to those step-
parents in more comfortable positions. The reason may well be the fiscal consideration 
of saving tax money. 
58. See Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N.W. 295 (1890); Crain v. Mallone, 130 
Ky. 125, 113 S.W.2d 67 (1908); Holland v. Beard, 59 Miss. 161, 42 Am. Rep. 360 (1881); 
State v. Thornton, 232 Mo. 298, 134 S.W. 519 (1911); Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 
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demanded of parents is one that would enable a child to be housed, 
fed, clothed, educated, and given medical care in a manner which 
satisfies minimum but acceptable community standards. Providing a 
child with bare subsistence is insufficient. Also, since support duties 
are a public responsibility to which both criminal and civil sanc-
tions attach, these duties cannot be avoided except in extraordinary 
circumstances, such as destitution;59 merely renouncing or improp-
erly delegating the duty is without force.60 When natural or adop-
tive parents make no provisions for support, those who do provide 
for the child may seek restitution from the parents.61 
The fact that a person has only a foster relationship with his 
child will ordinarily not relieve him of his support duty. Courts and 
statutes, enforcing a foster parent's support duty, speak of the doc-
trine of in loco parentis and in effect state that persons acting like 
natural parents assume support duties as if they were natural 
parents.62 Foster parents, therefore, may also be required to reim-
burse those who undertake to support their children. 63 The support 
responsibilities of foster parents may be imposed by contract. In a 
formal child placement:. in which the agency contracts with foster 
parents to provide a child with care and daily necessities, it can be 
said that the agency transfers its duty of support to the foster 
parents, although the agency probably continues to have subsidiary 
liability. Foster parents would be subject to civil liability if they 
failed to fulfill their obligations. 
N.W. 778 (1918); Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939). See also Jones, 
The Problem of Family Support: Criminal Sanctions for the Enforcement of Support, 
~8 N.C.L. REv. 1, 13 (1959); Pacht, supra note 56, at 21. 
59. See, e.g., Watts v. Steele, 19 Ala. 656, 54 Am. Dec. 207 (1851); In re Estate of 
Weisskopfs, 39 Ill. App. 2d 380, 188 N.E.2d 726 (1963); Fruen v. Fruen, 228 Minn. 
391, 37 N.W.2d 417 (1949); Libby v. Arnold, 161 N.Y.S.2d 798 (N.Y. City Dom. Rel. Ct. 
1957). 
60. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 93 Kan. 114, 143 Pac. 410 (1914); Huffman v. 
Hatcher, 178 Ky. 8, 198 S.W. 236 (1917); State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190 
(1922). 
61. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kirk, 212 Ky. 646, 279 S.W. 1091 (1926); Greenman 
v. Gillerman's Estate, 188 Mich. 74, 154 N.W. 82 (1915); Worthington v. Worthington, 
212 Mo. App. 216, 253 S.W. 443 (1923). See also Jones, supra note 58, at 12, 13. 
62. In re Harris, 16 Ariz. 1, 140 Pac. 825 (1914); Howard v. Randolph, 134 Ga. 691, 
68 S.E. 586 (1910); Faber v. Industrial Comm., 352 Ill. 115, 185 N.E. 255 (1933); 
Foreman v. Henry, 87 Okla. 272,210 Pac. 1026 (1922); Rosky v. Schmitz, 110 Wash. 547, 
188 Pac. 493 (1920); Ellis v. Cary, 74 Wis. 176, 42 N.W. 252 (1889). See also In re Adop-
tion of Cheney, 244 Iowa 1180, 59 N.W.2d 685 (1953); Brummitt v. Com, 357 S.W.2d 37 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1962); Britt v. Allred, 199 Miss. 786, 25 So. 2d 711 (1946); Austin v. 
Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 22 N.W.2d 560 (1946); Hollis v. Thomas, 42 Tenn. App. 407, 803 
S.W .2d 751 (1957); State ex rel. Gilroy v. Superior Court, 37 Wash. 2d 926, 226 P .2d 
882 (1951). 
63. See Rudd v. Fineberg's Trustee, 277 Ky. 505, 126 S.W.2d 1102 (1939). 
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3. Health and Education 
Natural and adoptive parents have a duty to establish an affec-
tionate relationship with their children and to nurture and protect 
their physical and emotional well-being. Also, they are expected to 
provide their children with guidance and to offer them the oppor-
tunity for educational development. Courts use the in loco parentis 
doctrine to impose these same responsibilities on foster parents. 
One context in which courts are asked to enforce health respon-
sibilities is where a parent has failed to provide his child with the 
necessities of health care. For instance, the parent, natural, adoptive 
or foster, may be required to compensate a physician who has pro-
vided professional services for a child without the knowledge of the 
parent. 64 A more immediate expression of a community policy pro-
tecting children's health is found in instances of child neglect. The 
state may spell out the scope of parental responsibilities by estab-
lishing health standards65 when a child is in immediate danger of 
death because of parental failure to consent to a surgical operation 
or blood transfusion, or when a child has been starved or mistreated, 
to mention only a few extreme examples. This prescription of 
health standards is indicative of what the state will not tolerate: 
parents who severely deprive their children of physical safety, emo-
tional security, or comfort. Discovery of violations of these standards 
may lead to criminal prosecution, temporary or permanent loss of 
custody, or state supervision of custody. 
Just as there is no clear statement of what constitutes the maxi-
mum or ideal of good health, neither is there any judicial or statu-
tory expression of the extent to which parents must enlighten their 
children. 66 The educational duty which rests on the parents begins 
with the birth of the child, and the duty is essentially, although not 
entirely, uncontrolled. There is almost no state supervision of the 
duty to educate until a child reaches five or six, although govern-
64. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953). 
65. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 39 Ga. App. 100, 146 S.E. 333 (1929); People ex rel. 
Wallace v. Labrenz, 4ll Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); 
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139 
N.W. 676 (1913); In re Carstairs, ll5 N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y. City Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952); 
People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903). 
66. A recent Ohio case held that parents have a duty to educate their children in 
areas grossly neglected in the schools, such as sex education. The court reversed the 
conviction of a mother for contributing to the delinquency of her minor daughter by 
instructing her in the use of birth preventive measures, ruling that the conviction 
violated the mother's constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. See State v. 
McLaughlin, 4 Ohio App. 2d 327, 212 N.E.2d 635 (1965). 
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• 
mental control could be assumed prior to those ages if the child 
were "neglected" by not having received rudimentary education. 
When their children reach the age of five or six, parents are ex-
pected to enroll them in educational institutions under state regula-
tion, to refrain from interfering with school attendance, and, in fact, 
to encourage their children's attendance until they reach a specific 
age (usually sixteen). State compulsory education acts contain crim-
inal sanctions which apply to parents who fail to fulfill their 
responsibilities. Whether parents must provide their children with 
educational opportunities beyond statutory compulsory education 
is an open question, depending perhaps on the economic and social 
situation of the parents. Recent trends in appellate case law suggest 
that parents may in fact be required to support their children in 
college.67 
4. Morality and Respect 
Closely associated with the parental duty to nurture health and 
education is the parent's responsibility to teach his child respect and 
to provide him with a moral environment in which he may develop 
sound character. This responsibility imposes on a parent, whether 
natural, adoptive or foster, an obligation to train his child in differ-
entiating "right" from "wrong," and to develop his child's con-
science. It also requires a parent to teach by example, that is, to 
conduct himself in a manner that his child may emulate. Further-
more, although this duty is rarely articulated, the parent is expected 
to instill in his child respect for the parent as an individual and an 
authority figure, and, as the child matures, to implant in him respect 
for other persons and authorities in society. To assist in the develop-
ment of respect for authority, courts give parents wide latitude in 
the exercise of their disciplinary powers. An underlying reason for 
this latitude is the thought that one way in which children learn to 
67. Courts are presently split as to whether a college education is a necessity for 
which the father must provide. One Ohio court has held that a college education is 
not included among the "necessaries" which a parent is "legally required" to furnish 
a child. Ford v. Ford, 109 Ohio App. 495, 167 N.E.2d 787 (1959). But another Ohio 
court, in the same year, held that whether a college education is a necessary is a 
relative matter and "considering the progress of society and our nation's need for 
citizens educated in the humanities and sciences, a college education is a necessary 
where the minor's ability and prospects justify it." Calogeras v. Calogeras, 163 N.E.2d 
713, 720 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1960). It has been stated that the most important factors in 
determining a father's liability for the expenses of a child's education are the father's 
ability to pay and the child's capacity for further education. Pincus v. Pincus, 197 
A.2d 854 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 210 A.2d 549 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1965). See also Commonwealth v. Rice, 206 Pa. Super. 393, 213 A.2d 179 (1965); O'Brien 
v. Springer, 202 Misc. 210, 107 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Commonwealth v. Decker, 
204 Pa. Super. 156, 203 A.2d 343 (1964). 
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adjust to the mandates of society is through the proper use of 
discipline. 
The moral conduct expected of parents is rarely defined in terms 
of specific religious dogma since, as individuals, parents are not 
required to follow the dictates of a particular religion, although the 
tenets of the dominant Judeo-Christian culture may influence the 
standards of parental conduct. The moral conduct necessary to fulfill 
parental responsibilities usually encompasses notions of "common 
decency, cleanliness of mind and body, honesty, truthfulness, and 
proper respect for established ideals and institutions."68 A parent is 
free to choose the method by which his child will be inculcated 
with a sense of morality, and he need not utilize religious training 
for this purpose. In fact, courts have consistently stated that parents 
have no duty to give their children any religious training. Parents 
are, therefore, as free to ignore religion in their home as they are to 
rear their children in a particular faith. 69 
B. Relevance of the Goals of the Parent-Child Relationship 
to Child Custody Disputes 
It is interesting to observe the reluctance of courts to set any-
thing but minimum and often only vague standards when enforcing 
parental duties. Yet when courts are faced with the problem of es• 
tablishing a new parent-child relationship, they seem to feel that the 
factors which are decisive in that context are radically different from 
those relevant in the administration of an existing relationship. 
Thus, in invoking "the best interests of the child" doctrine when 
choosing a custodian, courts might ignore the community expecta-
tions of parenthood which have been discussed above and make a 
disposition entirely inconsistent with our notions of parental respon• 
sibilities. 
Examples of the courts' lack of specificity in enforcing parental 
duties are found in cases involving a child's financial security, 
where courts rarely say anything more than that the child must be 
provided with a decent standard of living, whatever that may be. It 
is also unclear whether the standard of the child's education should 
68. See L v. N, 326 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Mo. 1959). 
69. Courts have generally stated that it is outside the province of the law to regu-
late religious activities in the home. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963); Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956); Wojnarowicz 
v. Wojnarowicz, 48 N.J. Super. 349, 137 A.2d 618 (Ch. 1958); Paolella v. Phillips, 27 
N.Y. Misc. 763, 209 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1960); People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 
N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936); Hackett v. Hackett, 78 Ohio L Abs. 485, 150 N.E.2d 431 
(Ct. App. 1958). 
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be set at a minimum level or at the highest potentialities of the 
child. 70 Questions about the extent of parental responsibilities are 
unanswered in other areas. For instance, what are the standards for 
furthering a child's physical and emotional well-being beyond re-
quiring a parent to protect his child from immediate dangers? Must 
the parent take positive steps to ensure optimum good health? 
Should the standard for physical health be set at seeking high ath-
letic attainment? As to the emotional health of the child, should the 
standard be the ability to be stimulated, to form positive relation• 
ships with others, or to participate effectively in group activities? 
Does a parent's responsibility to further a child's respect for others 
include promoting equal respect for persons of all races and reli-
gions and in all levels of the social strata? The lack of answers to 
these questions may be attributable to the courts' failure to consider 
them seriously. 
Courts tend to be more specific when faced with questions of 
morality and religion, but their decisions are most frequently 
phrased in negative terms. In order to teach a child social responsi-
bility, special ethical training is not necessary, nor need the spiritual 
aspects of life be encouraged by attending religious services.71 Or-
ganized religions are not necessarily preferred over other ethical 
systems, including atheistic systems,72 and one religious faith is not 
preferred over others, 73 although there seems to be a certain reluc-
tance to favor individuals with unusual or unpopular views over 
those who follow Judea-Christian beliefs. These decisions best illus-
trate the dichotomy which may exist between the goals of parent-
hood and the application of "the best interests of the child" doc-
trine to the initial selection of custodians. Parents in an existing 
relationship are permitted considerable discretion in the regulating 
of their child's moral development. However, in custodial disposi-
tions, the courts may look to the religious, philosophical and polit-
ical qualifications of the applicants and construe "the best interests 
of the child" so as to discriminate against persons adhering to 
certain, perhaps unorthodox, ideologies. 
In a recent and now celebrated Iowa case, Painter v. Bannister,7'' 
Mr. Painter, the natural father of a seven-year-old boy, brought a 
writ of habeas corpus against Mr. and Mrs. Bannister, the child's 
maternal grandparents, to regain custody of the child. After the 
70. See note 67 supra. 
71. See, e.g., Welker v. Welker, 24 Wis. 2d 570, 129 N.W.2d 134 (1964). 
72. See, e.g., Cory v. Cory, 70 Cal. App. 2d 563, 161 P.2d 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945). 
73. See, e.g., Angel v. Angel, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 531, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 136, 140 N.E.2d 
86 (C.P. 1956). 
74. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. Week 3082 (U.S. 
Sept. 3, 1966) (No. 518). 
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child's natural mother had died in 1963, his father had arranged for 
the grandparents to care for him in their home. A year later, the 
father remarried and asked the grandparents to return the child. 
They refused, and the father brought the present action. In 1965, the 
trial court granted the writ and awarded Mr. Painter custody of his 
son, but stayed execution of the judgment until the matter could 
be determined on appeal. In February 1966, the Iowa Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the lower court, stating that the best 
interests of the child would be promoted by allowing the grand-
parents to retain custody. 
The factors which the Iowa Supreme Court viewed as material 
in choosing the grandparents' home and way of life over the natural 
father's make it apparent that in child custody cases courts clearly 
move beyond the goals of parenthood discussed earlier. Because of 
their discretionary powers, the courts may in fact frustrate these 
goals. Note the Iowa court's language in describing and comparing 
the characteristics of the Painters and the Bannisters: 
We are not confronted with a situation where one of the con-
testing parties is not a fit or proper person. • . . As stated by the 
psychiatrist who examined Mr. Painter at the request of Ban-
nisters' attorneys: "It is evident that there exists a large differ-
ence in ways of life and value systems between the Bannisters 
and Mr. Painter, but in this case, there is no evidence that psychiat-
ric instability is involved. Rather, these divergent life patterns seem 
to represent alternative normal adaptations." 
It is not our prerogative to determine custody upon our choice 
of one of two ways of life within normal and proper limits and 
we will not do so. However, the philosophies are important as they 
relate to Mark and his particular needs. 
The Bannister home provides Mark with a stable, dependable, 
conventional, middle-class, middlewest background and an oppor-
tunity for a college education and profession, if he desires it. It 
provides a solid foundation and secure atmosphere. In the Painter 
home, Mark would have more freedom of conduct and thought 
with an opportunity to develop his individual talents. It would be 
more exciting and challenging in many respects, but romantic, 
impractical and unstable. 
The house in which Mr. Painter and his present wife live 
"is a very old and beat up and lovely home . . . ." The large yard 
on a hill in the business district . . . is of uncut weeds and wild 
oats. The house "is not painted on the outside because I do not 
want it painted." 
Mr. Painter is either an agnostic or atheist and has no concern 
for formal religious training. He has read a lot of Zen Buddhism 
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and "has been very much influenced by it." Mrs. Painter is Roman 
Catholic. They plan to send Mark to a Congregational Church 
. . . on an irregular schedule. [The court also noted that Mr. 
Painter is a political liberal.] 
These matters are not related as a cnuosm of Mr. Painter's 
conduct, way of life or sense of values. An individual is free to 
choose his own values, within bounds, which are not exceeded 
here. They do serve however to support our conclusion as to the 
kind of life Mark would be exposed to in the Painter household. 
We believe it would be unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, 
and probably intellectually stimulating. 
Were the question simply which household would be the most 
suitable in which to raise a child, we would have unhesitatingly 
chosen the Bannister home. We believe security and stability in the 
home are more important than intellectual stimulation in the 
proper development of a child.75 
These excerpts indicate that "the best interests of the child" 
doctrine permits a court to camouflage its own values, provincial 
community values, or the interests of dominant local institutions. 
Absent guidelines, there is no method for evaluating the application 
of the doctrine. Review, then, becomes as unpredictable as the deci-
sion of the trial court because an abuse of discretion cannot be 
subjected to any discernible standards. Presently, appellate review of 
child custody cases serves either to reaffirm the values previously ex-
pressed by the lower court or, more rarely, to substitute the pref-
erences of the appellate court for those of the lower court. 
C. Summary 
The main purpose of this discussion was to illustrate what one 
might call the minimum goals of parenthood. These goals, found in 
cases involving the supervision of the parent-child relationship, may 
be helpful in determining factors relevant for the purpose of choos-
ing custodians. To summarize, the following appear to be the basic 
goals of the parent-child relationship: to maintain an orderly, stable 
and loyal relationship so that the government will not be required 
to intervene in that relationship; to provide a financial base which 
will enable a child to mature into a healthy adult and to acquire the 
skills necessary to participate in and contribute to the economic 
processes of society; to nurture the child's physical and emotional 
safety, health and comfort; to provide a child with guidance and the 
opportunity for educational development; to teach a child respect 
75. Id. at 154, 155, 156. 
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for his parents, other authorities and human beings; and to train a 
child in social responsibilities. 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The judicial role in child custody matters should be creative. 
The court should conduct an inquiry, independent of the agency's, 
to find the specific family unit best fitted for the child. This inquiry 
necessitates studying closely the familial patterns actually estab-
lished. But this examination should not be exclusive. The court 
should widen the scope of inquiry beyond the immediate claimants. 
It should investigate alternative placements if it is not fully satisfied 
either with the qualifications of the persons claiming custody or 
with the immediate plans for the child. Further, courts should re-
quire concrete plans for a child rather than be forced into deciding 
a custody case on the basis of agency assumptions which may be 
unrealistic or influenced by factors that have no connection with the 
welfare of the child. According to this concept of the information 
gathering stage of the judicial process, the trial court's approach in 
Child Care was not adequate. The court's failure to question 
the Agency's assumptions and plans for the child was serious. If it 
had directed a re-examination of the Agency's plans to place Laura 
with "neutral parents," it might have discovered that "neutrality" 
or a non-human environment is foreign to child placement policies.76 
In fact, a "neutral environment" could not have been found.77 
76. In commenting on the Child Care case, Miss Lydia Rapoport has written: 
We do know nothing can flourish in a neutral environment, least of all a human 
being. 'Whatever arguments and current re-evaluations there may be of the work 
of Spitz and Bowlby, they have convincingly demonstrated that "neutrality" or a 
non-human environment produces non-human beings and even physical atrophy. 
'\\Te do know, with a fair degree of certainty, that the greatest damage to healthy 
psychological development is instability-and the kinds of impediments that 
interfere with the process of identity formation. We also know that long-term 
separation (after the capacity for the development of object relationships-at 
whatever age various experts may decide this is) causes damage. Perhaps one 
cannot talk of permanent damage because of the maleability of the human 
organism. However, I am convinced that the scarring process is permanent. All 
this, the child care agencies know very well. It would be impossible for foster 
parents to create a climate of neutrality and still carry out their parental obli-
gations and role. It struck me that the child care agency, for whatever reasons, 
was confused regarding its central obligation: that of the well being of the child. 
Rapoport, "Safeguarding the Child's Best Interests: A Discussion" (unpublished paper 
presented at the American Orthopsychiatric Association Meeting in San Francisco on 
April 13, 1966). 
77. The ironic sequel to Child Care was that the "neutral environment" suggested 
by the Agency was not the ultimate placement for Laura; she experienced multiple 
placements (almost predicted by Judge Froessel in his dissenting opinion, see note 24 
supra). Within two years after the New York Court of Appeals' decision was 
rendered, Laura had been in two settings. The child was first placed with her natural 
mother and then in her maternal grandmother's home. See GOLDSTEIN&: J. KATZ, THE 
FAMILY AND THE LAW 1033-34 (1965). 
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There should be some limitations, however, on the judicial role. 
Abuse of judicial discretion, such as the arbitrary determination 
found in Child Care, should be checked. It is suggested that the use 
of judicial discretion be restricted by clarifying "the best interests of 
the child" doctrine in terms of the specific community goals of the 
parent-child relationship discussed above. That is, when choosing a 
custodian for a child, the following questions should form the basis 
for the court's investigation and decision: 
(1) What disposition will provide the child with a stable, 
orderly, and loyal parent-child relationship, thus lessening 
the likelihood that the state will have to interfere with the 
relationship in the future? 
(2) What disposition will furnish the child with the economic 
base necessary for him to become a useful and productive 
member of society? 
(3) What disposition will provide the child with an environ-
ment that will foster physical and emotional health? 
(4) What disposition will furnish the child with an environ-
ment that will encourage educational goals? 
(5) What disposition will provide the child with an environ-
ment that will promote equal respect for all human beings 
and will give him an opportunity to mature into a morally 
stable and responsible adult? 
The purpose of framing "the best interests of the child" doctrine 
in terms of these general questions is to direct the scope of inquiry 
to particular operative factors serving community goals. Further-
more, the questions may furnish a checklist for organizing the 
amorphous data that is produced in child custody disputes. 
Once the scope of judicial inquiry is narrowed, the next task is 
an evidentiary one. Courts should draw on the knowledge of various 
disciplines. Information gathered from fields such as psychiatry, 
psychology, sociology, social work, theology, and education may 
demonstrate the extent to which certain characteristics of the child 
and the claimants are important in achieving the objectives of the 
parent-child relationship. The behavioral sciences also can aid in 
answering perhaps more fundamental questions, namely, the effect 
of parental personalities and behavior on a child, the extent to 
which environment outside the family affects the child, and the im-
pact on the child of both his maturation and his socialization. The 
result of such an approach will hopefully be that the child is the true 
beneficiary of a custodial dispute, not the parents and not the 
agencies. 
